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Abstract
The main motivation for this paper is the recognition of the fact that asymmetric information in the
form of moral hazard and adverse selection results in sizeable efficiency losses.  These costs are passed back
to producers in the form of excessively high premium rates and also passed back to the government via the
crop insurance subsidy program.  A secondary motivation stems from a recent debate in the literature
regarding the specific effects of moral hazard on agricultural input use.  Conventional wisdom suggests that
moral hazard will induce producers to reduce input usage.  A competing hypothesis has emerged which
suggests that moral hazard may induce producers to increase their usage of risk increasing inputs.
  The main objective of this paper was to develop a model of agricultural insurance to understand
why asymmetric information problems might exist and to compute and evaluate the relative program costs
of agricultural insurance that can be attributed to moral hazard and adverse selection.  These objectives are
achieved by developing a theoretical model of agricultural insurance, and by conducting numerical
simulations of the model. 
Simulation results indicated that insured farmers use less agricultural inputs than uninsured farmers
in an attempt to maximize expected indemnities. Moral hazard was found to be a significant problem only at
higher coverage levels.  Expected returns (in terms of expected indemnities) to agricultural insurance were
found to vary substantially between productivity (i.e., risk) types, and farmers were shown to recognize and
respond to these differences.  These results suggest that crop insurance is confronted with an adverse
selection problem.  Simulation results further indicated that program costs to a myopic insurer attributed to
moral hazard and adverse selection could be substantial.1
A Model of Agricultural Insurance in Evaluating  
Asymmetric Information Problems
I.  Introduction
Insurers offering contracts to prospective agents normally face two problems as a result of asymmetric
information; adverse selection and moral hazard.  Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), Wilson (1977), and Stiglitz (1977)
examine insurance contracts with adverse selection.  Under adverse selection the informational asymmetry arises
because insureds have private information about their exogenous accident probabilities, but insurers do not have
access to such information
1.  As a result, insurers are unable to distinguish among individuals under hidden type
asymmetric information.  Because of the insurer's inability to categorize between risk types, Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1977) show that if a pooling contract is offered, the low risk types would be more likely to opt out of insurance
since the high risk types impose a higher cost on the premium.  For a myopic insurer this is a problem as the high
risk types behaviour, with insurance, is to use less inputs compared to no insurance.  This in turn imposes a higher
cost to the insurer of any coverage level than would be implied by any low risk types behaviour.  Consequently, the
actuarial structure of the policy as perceived or measured by insurers will no longer be valid, and losses may result. 
Moral hazard refers to a problem whenever the insureds have a disincentive to supply proper amounts of
productive inputs when their actions cannot be observed and contracted for directly.  Moral hazard may alter input
use in a way that deviates from social optimality because of incompatible incentives (Holmstorm, 1982).  Arrow
(1963) defined incompatible incentives in the context of moral hazard as those incentives that induce insured people
to take fewer precautions against harm.  These actions cannot generally be monitored by the insurer, and increase the
probability and/or size of losses for which corresponding penalties cannot be levied by insurers (Smith and
Goodwin, 1996). 
Moral hazard is an example of economic interaction involving imperfect observability.  Since the insurer
                    
     1 This is a true statement for moral hazard when the insurer cannot observe the insureds loss probability , because
the insurer cannot observe the level of self-protection.2
cannot observe certain actions taken by the insured, these actions in turn have an effect upon the insurer's pay off. 
Hence, once insurance is purchased, the insured acts in a manner that increases the probability of loss that in turn
enhances the likelihood of a large claim being filed by the insured (Rubinstein and Yaari, 1983).  Such insurance
contracts enhance the inefficiency caused by moral hazard.  Since the resource use under moral hazard deviates from
social optimality, in turn this inefficiency could impose substantial program costs.  The problems associated with
moral hazard and adverse selection that affect the efficiency and equity of an agricultural insurance program have
major implications for farm level decision making and public policy formulation.  The relationship between
efficiency and equity and the program costs of the current agricultural insurance policies due to problems of moral
hazard and adverse selection have not been well documented (Islam, 1996).  Rather, informational asymmetry may
be reducing the welfare of agents and society as a whole because agents receive less than full coverage, and devote a
sub-optimal level of resources to loss prevention (Stewart, 1994). 
The main motivation of this paper is the recognition of the fact that asymmetric information in the form of
moral hazard and adverse selection results in sizeable efficiency losses.  These costs are passed back to producers in
the form of excessively high premium rates and also passed back to the government via the crop insurance subsidy
program.  A secondary motivation stems from a recent debate in the literature regarding the effects of moral hazard
on agricultural input use.  Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993), in an econometric study, found that the purchase of
crop insurance induced U.S. Midwest corn producers to increase their agricultural chemical use more than farmers
who did not purchase insurance.  In contrast, Smith and Goodwin (1996) found that insured wheat producers in
Kansas used less agricultural inputs than uninsured farmers which may be the result of the former farmers
attempting to maximize expected indemnities.  In a recent paper, Babcock and Hennessy (1996), also analyzed the
issue of input demand under insurance using simulation techniques and obtained results similar to Smith and
Goodwin in that insurance has a negative impact on input use.  The primary goal of this paper is to develop a model
of agricultural insurance in evaluating asymmetric information problems such as moral hazard and adverse selection.
The paper is arranged in five sections.  A model of decision making with output uncertainty and no3
insurance market is presented in section II.  Section III presents a model of agricultural insurance in an expected
utility theoretic framework using specific examples.  This section further presents the conjecture and corollaries
developed using the results of the comparative static analysis.  Simulations results and discussions pertaining to
moral hazard and adverse selection problems are presented in section IV.  Finally conclusions and policy
implications are drawn in section V.
II.   A Model of Optimal Input Use Without Agricultural Insurance
In this section, a model of optimal input use in the context of the no insurance scenario is developed.  The
purpose of developing this model is to compare and characterise the level of input use with and without insurance
that will eventually lead to a greater understanding of moral hazard and adverse selection and allow for the
computation and evaluation of related program costs.   
Let us start with a very simple model of production; one random variable, which is the yield outcome, one
unobservable variable input, x, the state of nature, ω , and an agent type specific parameter, θ .  Output is related to
that single input (x), farm productivity type θ , and the state of nature ω , with higher ω  being more favourable,
i.e.,∂∂ ω yc/ > 0.  We further assume that the insurer does not have any information about x or ω  or θ .  Now, let us
specify the production function as follows:
Before knowing the true state of nature, ω , a producer chooses an input level (x). Let us assume that the firm
maximizes the expected utility of profits.  Let U(.) be the firm's von Neumann - Morgenstern utility function where
U’(.)>0 and U’’(.)<0.  When individual coverage crop insurance is not available, then a rational producer chooses
(x) to maximize the following objective function:
~ y = f(x, , ) ωθ (1)4
where EU(π ) is the farmer's expected utility of profits; π  is the profits; P is the output price; and r is the unit cost of
input x.  Now, let us specify equation (1) by the following simple Cobb-Douglas production function
where α  is the production coefficient; ω  is the state of nature which is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, and θ
is a multiplicative shifter.  Assume that θ  accounts for the adverse selection problem associated with differing
productivity types, where θ∈ {θ L,θ H}.  In other words, θ =θ L for a low productivity type farm and θ =θ H for a high
productivity type farm, where θ H > θ L.
The insurer does not know θ  a priori and therefore cannot categorize between types (i.e., cannot identify
either θ L or θ H a priori).  The insurer cannot distinguish between farm types but does know there are different types
of agents.  The insurer does not know whether a given farmer is type θ L or θ H, but does assume a presumed fraction
of each type coming from the population.  For example, the insurer believes that θ L is the fraction of L- types and θ H
is the fraction of H-types.  However, the insured know her type a priori with certainty before buying insurance.  For
simplicity, it is also assumed that each agent faces (irrespective of types) a cost function C(x)=rx where x is the
variable input and r is the unit price of that input. 
A simple model of optimal input use without agricultural insurance is now developed using an expected
utility framework.  Without agricultural insurance, a rational producer chooses (x) to maximize the following
objective function formed by substituting (3),  ~ y = x
α θω , into (2):
x
 EU( )  =  Py  - rx  Max ~ π (2)





1  EU( )  =    U  Px   - rx    f( ) d Max πθ ω ω ω
α ∫ (4)5
For simplicity, we assume that the random variable ω  is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1.  As a result,
the height of the distribution f(ω )=1.  We also assume constant returns to scale (i.e., α =1.0) in the production
process.  We use the negative exponential utility function, which exhibits constant absolute (CARA) and increasing
relative risk aversion
2.  The form of the negative exponential function is
where e is the exponential and γ  is the risk aversion coefficient.  Since U(π ) is a CARA utility function as specified
in (5), and the probability density function f(ω )=1, (4) can be rewritten as
After integrating with respect to ω , the above objective function can be fully expressed as
The optimal choice of x can be characterized by differentiating equation (7) with respect to x which yields the
following first-order condition
Simplifying (8) further yields the following
                    
     2 The objective function defined in (6) is formulated using a CARA utility function, as an example, because it is more
convenient (since π  is not equal to -∞  to +∞ ), and we do not have to worry about the negative outcome of some states of
nature and therefore, would be a reasonable choice for this particular problem addressed in this study and would be
easy to adopt in our simulation exercises.
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Solving the above first-order condition (FOC) implicitly for x results in the utility maximizing input demand
function.  Since by (9), ∂ F/∂ x ≠  0, the implicit function theorem suggests that an implicit solution for x may be found
from the first order condition specified in (9) and can be implied by the following relationship
Under certain conditions provided by the implicit function theorem (i.e., ∂ F/∂ x ≠  0), the implicit function as
specified by (10), implies that there is an input demand function, such as x
*
NI=x(θ , P, γ , r) and that its derivatives
∂ x/∂θ , ∂ x/∂ P, ∂ x/∂γ , and ∂ x/∂ r can be calculated using the relationship specified in (11a) through (11d).
Comparative Static Results
The question this section addresses is how agricultural input demands respond to changes in the exogenous
variables, θ , P, γ  and r.  Under the neo-classical theory of production with certainty, one would expect that a rise in
output price evokes an increase in input use ∂ x/∂ P>0), and a rise in that input price evokes a decline in the use of
that input (∂ x/∂ r<0).  One might also expect that the firm's productivity type and land quality would affect input use
positively (∂ x/∂θ >0).  While the farmer's degree of risk aversion affecting input use negatively (∂ x/∂γ <0).  To
determine the relationship between x and θ , P, γ  and r, the FOC specified in (9) is totally differentiated 
3.
                    
     3 Totally differentiating (9) with respect to all arguments such as θ , P, γ  and r will yields the following relationship:
dF=(∂ F/∂ x)dx+(∂ F/∂θ )dθ +(∂ F/∂ P)dP+(∂ F/∂γ )dγ +(∂ F/∂ r)dr, where setting dF=dP=dγ =dr to zero, one would find dx/dθ  as
specified in (11a). In an analogous manner, we would be able to determine dx/dp, dx/dγ , and dx/dr as specified in
(11b), (11c) and (11d) respectively setting the relevant total partials equal to zero.
NI
* x  =  x ( ,P , , r ) θγ (10)7
Following (11a to 11d), if ∂ F/∂θ , ∂ F/∂ P, ∂ F/∂γ , and ∂ F/∂ r can be signed, then we would be able to determine
the sign for dx/dθ , dx/dP, dx/dγ  and dx/dr respectively.  For this particular problem, the denominator (i.e., ∂
2EU(π )/
∂ x
2) in each of the above equations would be unambiguously negative (i.e., ∂ F/∂ x = ∂
2EU(π )/ ∂ x
2 < 0) at a local
maximum for x according to the second order condition.  Therefore, in (11a to 11d), dx/dθ  to dx/dr will have the
same sign as ∂ F/∂θ  to ∂ F/∂ r.  After simplifying, the comparative static results are 
4.
                    
     4  For notational convenience, each of the following equations we defined M = e-γ Pxθ (xγ r-xγ Pθ -1)+(1-γ xr) and from the
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where M = e
-gPxq(xgr-xgPq-1)+(1-gxr)
From (12a), it is shown that ∂ F/∂θ  will be unambiguously positive, implying that marginal utility of profit
increases with productivity.  As a result, following (11a), dx/dθ  will be positive as well, since dx/dθ  will have the
same sign as ∂ F/∂θ .  For dx/dθ >0, implies that input use has a positive relationship with land quality and farm's
productivity.  From (12b), ∂ F/∂ P is found to be positive, implying that marginal utility of profit increases if output
price goes up.  Therefore, following (11b), dx/dP will be positive as well so that input use increases as output price
increase.  Following (12c), it is shown that ∂ F/∂γ  is unambiguously negative which implies that marginal utility of
profit decreases with increased risk aversion.  Since ∂ F/∂γ  is negative, following (11c), it can be shown that dx/dγ
will have the same sign as ∂ F/∂γ , i.e., dx/dγ <0, which implies that the higher the degree of risk aversion the lower
the level of input use.  Finally, following (12d), it is clear that ∂ F/∂ r<0 implies marginal that the utility of profit
decreases with increased per unit input cost.  Therefore, following (11d), dx/dr will be unambiguously negative
(since dx/dr will have the same sign as ∂ F/∂ r), which establishes the conventional relationship between x and r. 
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An implicit solution for the profit maximizing input level without insurance is given by equation (10).  In
this section we develop and extend the above model considering the possibility of agricultural insurance.  We can
then compare the no insurance case solution with the solution derived under individual coverage agricultural
insurance in terms of optimal input use, and from this characterize the problems of asymmetric information in
agricultural insurance.  A simple model of optimal input use decisions under an agricultural insurance contract, in a
general framework, is developed in the following section: 
The Model Formulation and Implications:
As defined earlier, the information on the state of nature is given by the variable ω , and for simplicity we
assume that ω  is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1
5.  Therefore, the probability density function, f(ω ), is equal
to 1.  We further assume that the insurer does not have any information about x or ω  or θ   a priori 
6. 
Let us define yc as the critical yield level so if actual yield (y) falls below the critical yield (yc) [i.e., y<yc],
the insurer makes up the difference.  In this situation the insured obtains an indemnity, Pe(yc-y) because of yield
short fall, where Pe is the elected price level on which insurance is determined.  Also, consider the same production
function as specified in (3),  ~ y = x
α θω , where θ  and ω  is defined in section II.  Let us represent the cost of
insurance (i.e., premium cost) as r.  Now the insured's profits under agricultural insurance can be defined as
                    
     5 For the general formulation of the model we use ω  ∈  [ω H, ω L] and later we use ω L=0, ω H=1 for simplicity, in our
specific example.  The assumption ω  ∈  [0,1] is a very special case about the probability distribution for ω . 
     6 It makes a big difference in terms of strategies that the insurer can take- whether he can observe either ω  and/or θ .
 For example, if ω  and θ  are observed then x can be inferred from the actual yield.  If ω  but not θ  (or if θ  but not ω ) can be
observed then x can not so easily be inferred.  However, if ω  can be observed then insurance contracts can be written
conditional on ω  and non observability of θ  will then lead to a true adverse selection (unknown types) problem.  Only if
both x and ω  are not observable (although θ  may be observed) will there be a significant deviation between ex ante and
ex post outcomes/expectations and a true moral hazard (unknown action)  problem.  However, if ω , and x are observed,
then θ  can be inferred from the actual yield.  Similarly, if θ , and x are observed, then ω  can also be inferred from the
πρ θ ω
ρθ ω
 =  Py -rx -   if  y   y   (i.e., if x    y )






In (13), the output price (P) is assumed to be equal to the elected price level (Pe).  Also keep in mind that under
actuarially fair insurance ρ  = E(Indemnity)
7.  Let τ(x) be the probability that y≤ yc.  This probability clearly depends
on input use level, x.  Now formally we can define τ(x) as
where ω c is the critical value of the state of nature, ω  when actual yield falls below the critical yield.  Alternatively,
(14) can be redefined as
which confirms the tautology that the chance of actual yield falling below the critical yield corresponds to a bad
state of nature.  From (14a), τ
´(x) <0 (where τ
´(x) = ∂τ (x)/∂ x = -(ycθ )/(xθ )
2 <0).  If x increases, output also increases,
thereby reducing the probability that y≤ yc holding risk constant (i.e., the relevant yield distribution can be thought of
as mean augmenting but variance preserving).  The probability distribution for ω , f(ω ), in conjunction with the level
of input used, x, induces a probability distribution on output y, h(y).  Let us define h(y) to be the height of the
probability distribution function for y.  Formally, the expected utility maximization problem with agricultural
insurance can be specified by the following objective function:
where  y(x,θ ) is the maximum attainable yield given x and θ .  The maximum yield  y(x,θ ) for x occurs at the value
ω =1 and so  y (x,θ )=xθ .  The insured's profit is comprised of two terms: the first term, τ(x) U(Pyc-rx-ρ ) falls as x
rises but the second term, ∫ U(Py(x) -rx-ρ ) h(y) dy, does not necessarily fall as x rises.  In equation (15), let's define
                                                                 
actual yield as well. 
     7 This will be so under actuarially fair insurance, however, here we want to consider other possibilities as well.  If
high and low productivity types are offered the same insurance contract, which may lead to adverse selection problems,
then it would not be the case that ρ =E(Indemnity) for either type. 
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c Max " πτρ ρ
θ
∫ (15)11
the first term of RHS as term T1 and the second term of RHS as term T2.  T1 can alternatively be defined as the
benefit (pay off) part of insurance if actual yield falls below the coverage yield (i.e., y≤ yc) and corresponds to bad
states of nature  (i.e., ω≤ω c) in which the insured receives an indemnity.  The first term occurs only when the actual
yield fall below the coverage yield and the farmer collects an insurance payment.  Using less input (which will drive
y to falls below yc for higher values of ω ) can trigger that benefit.  Moreover, even if x is sufficiently high, a very
low ω  (low yield) may also trigger that benefit.  Intuitively, the benefit part of the insured's profit function associated
with collecting an insurance payment decreases as he increases his input use level (provided that increasing input
use is risk reducing).   
The type specific parameter θ  plays an important role, particularly by affecting both the first and second
terms of the insured's profit function as specified in (15).  The parameter θ  has a positive relationship with insured's
profit in terms of the second term of the profit function.  However, a higher θ  has a negative effect on the first term
of farmer returns as specified in (15).  By definition τ(x)=yc/xθ , so if θ  increases, the probability of collecting an
indemnity decreases since τ
´(θ ) = -(ycx)/(xθ )
2 <0, because τ is also a function of θ .  In other words, the higher the
productivity of the farm, the lower the probability that actual yield falls below the coverage yield.  The impact of θ
on the first term of (15) could be either less than or equal to zero (i.e., ∂π /∂θ≤ 0), but, ∂π /∂θ  must be positive in
regards to the second term of (15).  Thus, the net effect on profits from a change in productivity type under an
optimal choice of x is ambiguous.
 The objective function specified in (15) can be reexpressed in terms of the probability density function
(pdf) for ω  as
() ()
()()
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In (16), the probability of collecting an indemnity (i.e., τ(x)=yc/xθ ) must be bounded between 0 and 1.  It is clear
from (16) that an increase in x reduces τ(x) (since τ(x)=yc/xθ ) and U(Pyc -rx-ρ ) and so clearly dT1/dx <0.  This is
intuitively obvious since the greater input one uses, the less the chance the individual will make use of the insurance
program 
8 (i.e., there is a chance of collecting lower expected indemnities) as actual yields are increased, everything
else being equal.  Moreover, higher input use increases costs with no compensating advantage for states of the world
in which the insured's actual yield falls below the critical yield (i.e., y<yc) and yields are bumped up to yc regardless
of the level of x.  This suggests that with insurance there will be a point of input reduction which leads the farmer to
use no input at all.  In other words, if the coverage level increases, the likelihood of extreme moral hazard would
also increase.  Note that MPPx is equal to zero for y≤ yc.  So that using less input will always increase the benefit
(i.e., the chance of collecting higher expected indemnities) of having insurance. 
The effect of input usage on T2 (i.e., the second term of RHS in equation 16) is not as obvious as on T1.  T2
explains the expected utility of profit an insured farmer could obtain if actual yield is above the critical yield (i.e.,
y>yc) and corresponds to good states of nature (i.e., ω >ω c) in which no indemnities are paid.  In T2 increasing x
increases the yield conditional on ω , but also the cost of production.  Also, for greater x we have a greater range of
states of world, ω∈ [yc/xθ ,1], in which the insurance policy provides no benefits.  This increases the benefits (since
increasing x, increases profits until MPPx=r/P) from using more input when MPPx is positive.
Using CARA, the expected utility maximization problem specified in (16), can be re-specified as
                    
     8 This may be generally true.  If increased application of an input raises E(Y) and variance, however, this may not
actually increase the likelihood that insurance indemnities will be collected.  Because within a single planting year, the
critical yield (yc) that triggers indemnity under the existing Multiple Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI) program is determined by
a farm's yield history.  Therefore, any increase in E(Y) due to increased use of an input basically reduces the probability
that actual yield will fall below the coverage yield, which in turn lowers the probability that indemnities will be collected.
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After integrating the second term of RHS of equation (17) with respect to the random state of nature ω , the above
maximization problem can be expressed fully as
Differentiating (18) with respect to x and after collecting terms, results in the following first order condition
Simplifying (19) further yields the following
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) , , , , , ( c WI y y r P x x ρ θ =
∗ (21)
As no explicit function exists for (20) it is impossible to determine the sign of these derivatives (i.e., ∂ x/∂ P,
∂ x/∂θ , ∂ x/∂γ , ∂ x/∂ r, ∂ x/∂ρ , and ∂ x/yc) by direct means.  Instead, simulation models are used to determine the
relationships between input demand (x) and P, θ , γ , r, ρ , and coverage level, yc.  From the first-order condition
specified in (20), an input demand function under individual coverage agricultural insurance is described by the
following implicit function:







o) that satisfies F(.) = 0, then a plausible input demand function such as xWI
*=x(θ , P, γ , r, ρ , yc) can be
defined in the neighbourhood of that point.  Consequently, the derivatives ∂ x/∂ P, ∂ x/∂θ , ∂ x/∂γ , ∂ x/∂ r, ∂ x/∂ρ , and





This section addresses how an individual's input demands respond to changes in P, θ , γ , r, ρ , and coverage
level, yc when he buys insurance.  Even in the insurance scenario, one would expect that a rise in output price would
evoke an increase in the use of the input and a rise in that input price would evoke a decline in the use of that input. 
One might also expect that the firm's productivity type and land quality may affect input use positively, with the
farmer's degree of risk aversion affecting input use negatively (Babcock and Hennessy, 1996).  Moreover, one might
also expect that the coverage level (yc) may affect input use negatively (Babcock and Hennessy, 1996; Smith and
Goodwin, 1996), and the cost of insurance (i.e., premium, ρ ) may have no impact on input use at all if the premium
is unsubsidized.  Therefore, one would epect the following comparative static results on input use under insurance:15
∂ x/∂ P>0, ∂ x/∂θ >0, ∂ x/∂γ <0, ∂ x/∂ r<0, ∂ x/∂ρ =0, and ∂ x/∂ yc<0.  With insurance, totally differentiating (20) with
respect to θ , P, γ , r, ρ  and yc yields complex and long equations from which determination of signs are impossible
using direct means and also difficult to evaluate.  Therefore, we will make use of numerical simulation exercises to
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 Following (22a to 22f), if we can assign signs on ∂ F/∂θ , ∂ F/∂ P, ∂ F/∂γ , ∂ F/∂ r, ∂ F/∂ρ , and ∂ F/∂ yc, then we
would be able to determine the signs for dx/dθ , dx/dP, dx/dγ , dx/dr, dx/dρ , and dx/dyc respectively.  For this
particular problem, the denominator (i.e., ∂
2EU(π )/∂ x
2) in each of the above equations would be unambiguously
negative at a local maximum for x according to the second order condition.  Therefore, in (22a to 22f), dx/dθ  to
dx/dyc will have the same sign as ∂ F/∂θ  to ∂ F/∂ yc. 
For example, here we only consider the case ∂ F/∂ yc, the relationship between optimal input use and the
coverage level because this one is very critical/important for this study.  Moreover, the general moral hazard effect
of insurance on input choice can also be found from this comparative static result.  The effect of coverage level (yc)
on the optimal input use is found by differentiating (20) with respect to yc yielding the following comparative static
result. 
The product of the terms outside the brackets in equation (23) is positive.  The denominator inside the
brackets is also positive (since x, θ >0).  Under risk aversion the numerator inside the brackets will be negative if and
only if (γ xr-1)<0 (i.e., the necessary condition is γ <1/xr).  Intuitively, higher risk aversion may mean less input with
or without insurance.  Same as the no insurance scenario, with agricultural insurance, the more risk averse is the
insured, the lower will be the input use and subsequently expected yields which increases the relative chance of
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since moral hazard is really the difference in input use between the two environments of insurance versus no
insurance.  However, the necessary condition γ <1/xr is likely to hold under insurance, which in turn implies ∂ F/∂ yc
must be negative and consequently optimal input use decreases with an increase in coverage level (yc).  Based on the
comparative static result of the theoretical model that insurance affects input use negatively (i.e,. perceived moral
hazard), the chance of collecting more indemnities can increase.  Consequently, the following conjecture can be
stated.
Conjecture 1:  An increase in coverage level (yc) decreases the optimal level of input use (x) under
agricultural insurance for a given level of risk aversion (i.e., ∂ xWI/∂ yc < 0), holding risk aversion coefficient,
γ =constant). 
One corollary can be stated from this conjecture as follows:
Corollary 1: Using less inputs always increases the benefit (i.e., the chance of collecting higher expected
indemnities) of having agricultural insurance, i.e., ∂ EIWI/∂ xWI < 0.
   Conjecture 1 outlines the conventional moral hazard effect that insurance reduces input use.  This
theoretical result is consistent with Smith and Goodwin (1996), and Babcock and Hennessy (1996).  However, it
contradicts with Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993), as they pointed out that increases in the insurance coverage level
(yc) tend to increase input use because of scale of production risk decreases.     The difference between the
optimal input use level implied by (21), in the insurance scenario, and (10), in the no insurance scenario, depends on
the probability density function for ω , f(ω ), the parameters θ , γ , r and yc and also depends on the cost of the input (r)
and the marginal physical product (MPPx) of that input.  The input level chosen by the insured implied by (21) may
be greater or less than that implied by (10).  Whether insurance increases or decreases the input use is an empirical
issue and will be analyzed and discussed fully through simulation exercises in section IV.  As mentioned at the18
beginning of the model development that the difference between the level of input use in the no insurance scenario
to an insurance scenario will lead to a greater understanding of the moral hazard issue and would allow us to
compute and evaluate the relative program costs.  Given that, an attempt has been made in the following section to
evaluate optimal input decisions and to compute and evaluate the related program costs that may be attributed to the
problems of asymmetric information such as moral hazard and adverse selection.    
IV.  Simulations Results and Discussions 
9
The broad objectives of this paper are to characterize the benefits of agricultural insurance; analyze
the issue of optimal input decisions with and without insurance; and simulate and evaluate the program
costs attributed to the problems of asymmetric information. To address these issues, a theoretical decision
making model with output uncertainty and no insurance was developed and extended to include agricultural
insurance in the previous sections.  In this section, simulation exercises are designed to evaluate the effects
of agricultural insurance on optimal input decisions with asymmetric information and allowing  for the
computation and evaluation of the consequential program costs related to moral hazard and adverse
selection problems.  Simulation exercises were performed using the objective functions without and with
insurance as specified in (7) and (18) in sections II and III respectively.  In model simulations, the following
base parameter values were used.
P =  $5.0 (per unit output price);
r = $2.0 (per unit input cost);
θ  ∈  {1,2}=productivity index (1 for low productivity type and 2 for high productivity type);
γ  ∈  {0.05, 0.5, 1.0} = risk aversion coefficient;
and xi = i/100; I = 1..2500.
                    
     9 A detail description of model simulations procedure, key input equations used, variables parameterized
and solutions obtained for the choice variable, x and the expected utility values for moral hazard and adverse
selection problems, can be obtained from authors.  The software "MathCad PLUS 6.0" was used to perform
numerical simulations.       19
Characterising the Moral Hazard Problem: Optimal Input Decisions
A model of optimal input use in the no insurance scenario as developed in equation (7), and a model
of optimal input use under insurance, as developed in equation (18) are used to compute optimal levels of
input use, output, premiums, expected indemnities and the program costs of moral hazard and adverse
selection.  This section presents simulation results pertaining to the moral hazard problem. Conjecture 1 and
corollary 1 outlined in section III are supported by the simulation results presented in Tables 1 and 2.  All
results are derived under the assumption of constant returns to scale. 
With no insurance, optimal input use for high productivity types is 9.6 units under the given price
and risk aversion assumptions (Table 1), which is graphically expressed in Figure 1.  Optimal level of input
with insurance at a 10% coverage level for high productivity types is found to be 9.58 units and is depicted
in Figure 2.  Optimal levels of input without and with insurance at various coverage levels are reported in
columns 3 and 4 respectively in Table 1.   
Insurance Coverage and Response of Input use
Optimal input use is smaller with insurance from the no insurance scenario.  At low coverage levels
(i.e., at 10% to 35% in our example), optimal input use with insurance is very close to the no insurance
solution (Table 1).  For example, input use with insurance at a 35% coverage level is 9.47 units as compared
to the no insurance case of 9.60 units.  At low coverage levels, the chances of collecting expected
indemnities is very low  since it is difficult to drive actual yield below the critical yield even if the insured
practices extreme moral hazard.  Therefore, there is no compensating advantage of lowering input usage
significantly when coverage levels are low.  However, if coverage levels increase, the likelihood of extreme
moral hazard also increases.  With insurance, there comes a point of insurance coverage at which the farmer
may (theoretically) decide to use no input at all.  In the case of high productivity (i.e, low risk) types, the20
insured uses no inputs at all with a coverage level at or above 40% (Table 1).  Coverage levels at or above
40%, substantially increase the insured's chance of collecting higher indemnities. 
At the 35% coverage level where the level of input use of 9.47 units with insurance is close to the
no insurance solution of 9.6 units, the expected indemnity (EIWI) that an insured could claim is only $1.49. 
At higher coverage levels, EIWI increases at an increasing rate which in turn incurs a higher program costs to
the insurer.  For example, at a 40% coverage level, expected indemnities with insurance, EIWI is $19.15,
while at a 80% coverage level, EIWI is $38.35. 
Let us explain the case of high productivity types.  The rational behind this behaviour is rather
straight forward.  First, it must be recalled that input demand is an implicit function of expected utility, and
from section III it was shown that ∂ xWI/∂ yc≤ 0 would hold in general.  In Figure 1, EU(π ) is seen as a
concave function of x; input will increase to the point of maximum expected utility.  However, with
insurance there are two local maximums as illustrated in Figure 2.  The first local maximum is a corner
point solution with x=0 while the global maximum is that x=9.58 units.  As coverage level (yc) increases
from 10% to 35% the corner point increases, which implies that there can be expected utility gains to
extreme moral hazard.  However, this corner solution at no point prior to 35% coverage exceeds the
expected utility associated with using approximately 9.5 units of input.  In fact, over this range input use
declines with an increase in yc, as predicted in theory, but only marginally.
At about 40% coverage the expected utility from using 0 units of input exceeds the
expected utility of using about 9.5 units of input (Table 1), and it becomes the new global maximum. 
Consequently, around this level of coverage there is a chance from marginal moral hazard to extreme moral
hazard, and there is a greater expected utility from insuring and using no inputs, than insuring and using
some inputs (recall that for low productivity type, this situation occurs even at a 20% coverage level, Table21
2).  The reason that this can happen, is because the premium charged under existing insurance, is based on
past yield histories and is independent of current optimizing behaviour.  The obvious caveats, relating to
multi-period monitoring as discussed by Dionne (1983) and Vercammen and van Kooten (1994), is that
such behaviour cannot persist.  However, simulation results illustrate what could possibly happen if ex post
monitoring is not a part of everyday business of insureds.  Furthermore, in subsequent periods any moral
hazard decisions would only serve to increase yield variance and hence, all other things being equal,
increase premium rates.     22
Table 1:  Characterizing Moral Hazard Under Constant Returns to Scale:
The Case of High Productivity Types 
































10 0.96 9.60 9.58 0.12 -0.54 -0.529 0.122 0.001
20 1.92 9.60 9.55 0.48 -0.54 -0.506 0.482 0.002
25 2.40 9.60 9.53 0.75 -0.54 -0.491 0.756 0.006
30 2.88 9.60 9.50 1.08 -0.54 -0.476 1.09 0.01
35 3.36 9.60 9.47 1.47 -0.54 -0.460 1.49 0.020
40 3.84 9.60 0 1.92 -0.54 -0.422 19.15 17.23
45 4.32 9.60 0 2.43 -0.54 -0.384 21.55 19.12
50 4.80 9.60 0 3.00 -0.54 -0.350 23.95 20.95
60 5.76 9.60 0 4.32 -0.54 -0.294 28.75 24.43
65 6.24 9.60 0 5.07 -0.54 -0.271 31.15 26.08
70 6.72 9.60 0 5.88 -0.54 -0.250 33.55 27.67
75 7.20 9.60 0 6.75 -0.54 -0.232 35.95 29.20
80 7.68 9.60 0 7.68 -0.54 -0.215 38.35 30.67
100 9.60 9.60 0 12.0 -0.54 -0.165 47.95 35.9523
Table 2:  Characterizing Moral Hazard Under Constant Returns to Scale: 
The Case of Low Productivity Types 



























10 0.25 4.92 4.87 0.03 -0.941 -0.941 0.031 0.001
20 0.49 4.92 0 0.125 -0.941 -0.891 2.45 2.32
25 0.61 4.92 0 0.19 -0.941 -0.867 3.05 2.86
30 0.74 4.92 0 0.275 -0.941 -0.844 3.65 3.38
35 0.86 4.92 0 0.375 -0.941 -0.823 4.30 3.90
40 0.98 4.92 0 0.49 -0.941 -0.802 4.90 4.41
45 1.11 4.92 0 0.62 -0.941 -0.783 5.50 4.88
50 1.23 4.92 0 0.77 -0.941 -0.765 6.10 5.33
60 1.48 4.92 0 1.11 -0.941 -0.732 7.35 6.24
65 1.60 4.92 0 1.30 -0.941 -0.716 7.95 6.65
70 1.72 4.92 0 1.51 -0.941 -0.702 8.60 7.09
75 1.84 4.92 0 1.73 -0.941 -0.688 9.20 7.47
80 1.97 4.92 0 1.97 -0.941 -0.675 9.80 7.83
100 2.46 4.92 0 3.08 -0.941 -0.631 12.27 9.1924
Fig. 1:   Optimal Level of Input Use in No Insurance Case (parameter values:  p = $5.0, r = $2.0, γγγγ
= 0.05, and θθθθ  = 2)
EU(x)
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Fig. 2:     Optimal Input Use with Insurance at a 10% Coverage Level  (parameter values: p = $5.0, r
= $2.0, γγγγ  = 0.05, and θθθθ  = 2)
EU(x)
Input use26
Given the structure of the model, and the coefficients used, the results discussed above suggest that
moral hazard is a significant problem with crop insurance only at high coverage levels.  According to the
simulations, at high coverage levels, the expected indemnities to the insured from using no inputs is greater
than the returns from using inputs at the no insurance level.  The result suggests that the likelihood of moral
hazard increases at an increasing rate with insurance coverage.  The general conclusion from our simulation
results that optimal input use decreases as the insurance coverage level increases, still holds.
The simulation results of this study strongly indicate that agricultural insurance affects input use
negatively.  This findings is not surprising and is consistent with most previous studies (Smith and
Goodwin, 1996; and Babcock and Hennessy, 1996).  Our simulation results support the econometric
findings of Smith and Goodwin (1996), and the simulation findings of Babcock and Hennessy (1996), who
found that farmers who buy crop insurance tend to decrease their agricultural input use compared to the
farmers who do not buy agricultural insurance.  In addition, the results of the study also indicate that the
farmers who buy higher coverage are more likely to practice extreme moral hazard than those who buy
insurance at a lower coverage level.  The intuition is that at higher coverage, using less inputs (or no inputs
at all), increases the probability that actual yields fall below the coverage yield, which in turn increases the
chance of collecting expected indemnities.       27
Program Costs 
10 of a Myopic Insurer Attributed to Moral Hazard
Program costs are calculated by taking the difference between the ex post expected indemnity, EIWI,
(i.e., that an insured would claim from a particular insurance contract if y≤ yc), and the premium actually
charged to the insured, ρ , and then multiplying it by the elected price level (Pe) for a particular insurance
contract
11.
Expected indemnities, premiums (ρ ) and the related program costs at different coverage levels for
both high and low productivity types are presented in Tables 1 and 2 respectively.  The results indicate that
there is a substantial difference in program costs at every coverage level between productivity types.  For
example, at a 20% coverage level, high productivity types impose a cost of only $0.002 as opposed to $2.32
by low productivity types since the latter practice extreme moral hazard.  In contrast, high productivity types
impose a cost of $30.67 as opposed to only $7.83 by low productivity types at a 80% coverage level implies
program costs should be less until the threshold coverage level.
There are two reasons for such a difference at higher coverage levels.  First, high productivity types
practice extreme moral hazard at relatively higher coverage levels.  Second, the choice of optimal input
under the no insurance scenario (based on which ρ  is computed) for high productivity types is significantly
higher than for low productivity types.  This implies that given the critical yield yc, the probability of loss
under the yield distribution relevant to high productivity types would be substantially higher compared to
                    
      10 Precisely, the program costs of agricultural insurance that can be attributed to the problems of
asymmetric information can be broken down into two main components.  The first component is associated with
only the monetary transfer from public insurers to insureds.  This is the result of insurers not being able to
costlessly monitor insureds post insurance behaviour or not being able to set an ex ante premium computed
based on farmers uninsured behaviour which would be ex post actuarially sound.  The second component is
associated with the distortion in resource use as a result of implicit moral hazard which would in turn result in
sizeable efficiency losses.  Thus, the true efficiency loss (i.e., economic cost) of agricultural insurance that can
be attributed to the problems of asymmetric information could be substantially higher than the program costs
characterized within this model.  Therefore, it must be noted that the methods proposed in this study in
computing the consequential program costs of moral hazard and adverse selection problems only deals with the
first component of true efficiency loss.
     11 To conserve space, the methodology to compute program costs of a myopic insurer from moral hazard
and adverse selection are not presented here.  However, the detail methodology of computing program costs
that can be attributed to the problems of asymmetric information such as moral hazard and adverse selection
can be obtained from authors. 28
the yield distribution relevant to low productivity types.  This is a general result which will hold if both




L) or the coefficient of variation (CV=σ /y)  for low
productivity types is not greater than that for high productivity types.            
Characterising the Adverse Selection Problem 
In the previous sections, we characterized the moral hazard problem in terms of input choice and
program costs.  In this section, the adverse selection problem is characterized in terms of optimal input
decisions by productivity types and the consequential program costs given an insurance contract is offered
based on pooled premiums.  The insurer offers a premium rate based on average losses for a group because
of the inability to categorise between risk types.  Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) showed that under pooling
contract only high risk individuals would tend to participate in the programs, and low risk individuals would
opt out of insurance since the high risk types impose a higher cost on the premium.  Along the lines of
Rothschild and Stiglitz, the following conjecture can be stated:
Conjecture 2:  An insurance contract that is not actuarially sound (i.e. when premium rates do not
accurately reflect loss risk), may lead to an adverse selection problem which in turn increases program
costs. 
For this paper, this can also be treated as a proposition and can be tested empirically.  To this end,
the motivation of this section is to test and evaluate this conjecture based on simulation results pertaining to
the adverse selection problem.  A simple Cobb-Douglas production function was defined by equation 3,
where variable θ  accounts for the adverse selection problem associated with differing productivity types. 
As assumed earlier, the insurer does not know θ  a priori and therefore cannot distinguish between types. 
The insurer's lack of knowledge about productivity types can be described by a presumed fraction of each
type coming from the population.  To this effect, we hypothesised a premium pooling scenario based on the
combinations of high and low productivity types that comprise the population.  In this case, we considered29
50% of each type comprises the population.   Simulation results under this premium pooling scenario are
presented in Table 3 and conjecture 2 is fully supported by the simulation results. 
Optimal Input Decisions by Productivity Types
In the no insurance scenario, optimal input choices are found to be 9.60 and 0.49 units for high and
low productivity types respectively under the given parameter values.  In this premium pooling scenario,30
Table 3:  Characterising Adverse Selection Problem:  Optimal Input Use and Program Costs
by Productivity Type (Considering 50% of Each Type)
(Parameter Values: P=5, r=2, γ H= 0.05, and γ L= 0.5)
Parameters and Variables Coverage Levels (% of EY)
10 15 25 50 60 70 80 100
Optimal Input Use: No Insurance Case
High Productivity Type: XH 9.60 9.60 9.60 9.60 9.60 9.60 9.60 9.60
Low Productivity Type: XL 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49
Expected Output (EY) 4.92 4.92 4.92 4.92 4.92 4.92 4.92 4.92
Coverage Level (yc) 0.492 0.738 1.23 2.46 2.95 3.45 3.94 4.92
Pooled Premium (
-ρ ) 0.62 1.235 2.465 5.54 6.77 8.0 9.235 11.69
Optimal Input Use: Insurance Scenario



































High Productivity Type: EI(H) 0.03 0.07 0.198 0.795 1.15 1.57 19.64 24.56
Low Productivity Type: EI(L) 2.435 3.665 6.13 12.28 14.745 17.2 19.67 24.59
Program Costs: CP
When H- Type Buys Insurance: CP(H) -0.59
* -1.16 -2.27 -4.75 -5.62 -6.43 10.41 12.87
When L- Type Buys Insurance: CP(L) 1.82 2.43 3.66 6.74 7.97 9.20 10.43 12.89
Total Program Costs (Weighted Average) 0.62 0.64 0.70 0.99 1.18 1.39 10.42 12.88
a,b Expected utility of profits with insurance, EU(π *) for each type are presented in the parentheses underneath the input use.  The expected utility of profits with no insurance, 
EU(π ) is  -0.54 and -0.941 for high and low productivity types respectively.
*   Program costs "negative" implies profit gain to the insurer, since in this case EIWI < r.31
optimal input decisions under insurance for H-types are generally close to the no insurance solution.  For
instance, at a 10% coverage level, input choice by H-types is 9.59 units under insurance as opposed to 9.6
units in the no insurance case.  Even at high coverage levels (eg, 70%), optimal input choice under
insurance is 9.46 (Table 3).  In contrast, irrespective of coverage level, the optimal input choice under
insurance for L-types is only 0 units as compared to 0.49 units in the no insurance case.  This result implies
that low productivity (high risk) farmers practice extreme moral hazard under insurance with pooled
premiums. 
The substantial differences in input choice with insurance between productivity types clearly
indicates that if premium rates do not accurately reflect loss risks, returns to insurance are distorted and
therefore, high risk individuals could increase their chance of collecting higher expected indemnities by
choosing no inputs at all.  Consequently, they would be more  likely to buy insurance at a given premium
compared to low risk individuals
12.         
                    
     12 We examined the expected utility of profit, EU(π ), with and without insurance to be able to determine
whether insurance will be purchased.  Expected utility of profits with and without insurance for both
productivity types are computed under pooled premium scenario to determine the insurance purchase decisions
between risk types.  Results pertaining to the expected utility of profits with insurance are reported in Table 3 in
the parentheses underneath the input use.  Comparing EU(π ) with EU(π∗ ) in this premium pooling scenario, it is
clear that at a given premium, high risk individuals would be more likely to buy insurance (since EU(π *) > EU(π )),
while low risk individuals would be likely to opt out of the program (since EU(π *) < EU(π )) irrespective of
coverage levels (where EU(π *) and EU(π ) are respectively the expected utility of profits with and without
insurance).      32
Program Costs from Adverse Selection
As mentioned earlier, if pooled premiums are offered for a particular insurance coverage, low
productivity (high risk) agents will be undercharged and high productivity (low risk) agents will be
overcharged at that premium.  High risk individuals that are undercharged will have higher expected  
indemnities, while low risk individuals will have lower expected indemnities than premiums.  Under such
mispricing, high risk types would impose more program costs than low risk types.  Simulation results
pertaining to the expected indemnity payouts and a single period program costs for a myopic insurer
attributed to adverse selection are also presented in Table 3.
The chance of collecting indemnities by productivity types differ substantially for any coverage
level at a given premium.  For example, at 70% coverage level, the pooled premium assuming equal
proportion of productivity types is found to be $8.0.  In the  absence of an actuarially sound insurance
market, both types receive the same coverage level at that premium.  However, there is a substantial
difference in expected indemnities given the purchase of that insurance contract at that premium rate.  The
expected indemnities are $1.57 for H-types as opposed to $17.2 for L-types.  Given the purchase of that
insurance contract, a high productivity type individual would generate a return to the program $6.43 while it
would cost the program $9.20 ($17.20 - $8.00) if a low productivity type would have bought this particular
contract. 
The total program costs are also reported in the last row of Table 3.  For instance, at a 70%
coverage level, total program costs under this premium pooling scenario are found to be $1.39
13.  If the
                    
     13 These are the weighted average program costs assuming both types would have bought this particular
contract at a given pooled premium.  However, if we assume that high productivity types will not buy insurance
at that pooled premium rate, then the program cost would be $9.20 rather than $1.39 at this particular coverage
level in this premium pooling scenario. 33
presumed fraction of high productivity (low risk) types is substantially larger than the fraction of low
productivity (high risk) types, then an insurer may gain since in this case the total premium collected  will be
greater than the total expected indemnity payouts.  These results further indicate that if the insurer cannot
categorise between types then program costs attributed to adverse selection can be partly explained by the
presumed fraction of each type coming from the population in an insured's pool.
Simulation results presented in Table 3 further indicate that the consequence of offering a pooled
contract to all agents irrespective of risk types undermine the actuarial soundness of an insurance contract
and in turn imposes a substantial single period cost to the insurer since only high risk agents would find
such a contract more profitable and therefore, would buy it.  The general conclusion from these results is
that if premium rates do not accurately reflect the likelihood of loss, returns to insurance are distorted and
low productivity (high risk) types are more willing to buy insurance at a given premium rate (i.e., pooled
premium) than high productivity (low risk) types. 
V.   Conclusions
This paper presented a theory of the effect of agricultural insurance on optimal input decisions and
also provided simulation results which explain the sources of program costs from moral hazard and adverse
selection.  Simulation results, within an expected utility framework, indicated that insured farmers use less
agricultural inputs than uninsured farmers in an attempt to maximize expected indemnities. 
The extent of program costs of moral hazard and adverse selection is being debated in the insurance
literature with some academics questioning the relative magnitude of these problems.  This research has
contributed to the debate by illustrating the costs of moral hazard and adverse selection.  Moreover, it
provided a methodology which could form the basis of a realistic approach to compute program costs34
attributed to moral hazard and adverse selection. 
The presence of moral hazard and adverse selection is identified in this paper.  Simulation results
indicated that the magnitude of program costs to a myopic insurer attributed to moral hazard and adverse
selection could be substantial.  This paper has demonstrated that existing agricultural insurance contracts are
inappropriate in mitigating the severity of moral hazard problem.  The results suggest that policy makers and
insurers need to direct their attention to various measures, such as ex ante regulation and monitoring, to
mitigate moral hazard problems. 
Simulation results further indicate that the expected return (in terms of expected indemnities) to
insurance was found to vary substantially between productivity types, and farmers were shown to recognize
and respond to these differences.  This clearly supports the arguments that the existing Crop Insurance is
confronted with an adverse selection problem.  The implications of this results is that policy makers need to
direct their attention to refinements in premium setting techniques in order to address the adverse selection
problem. 
Finally, the simulation results also indicated that empirical tests are not totally robust to alternative
model specifications and risk measures.  However, taken as a whole, these simulation results suggest the
presence of asymmetric information problems in the existing agricultural insurance contract without casting
any doubt in the minds of insurers, policy makers and the researchers.          35
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